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Taking and Pursuing a Case: Some
Observations Regarding "Legal
Ethics" and Attorney Accountability
By RIcHARD H. UNDERWOOD*
INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses some of the potential liabilities that
may arise from an attorney's decision to decline, refer, under-
take, continue or discontinue the prosecution of a civil action.
The author's participation in several sessions of the Annual
Intensive Course in Trial Advocacy, offered to practicing lawyers
through the University of Kentucky's Office of Continuing Legal
Education, intensified his interest in the subject matter.'
Among the problems presented in that course is a hypothet-
ical file concerning the plight of a general practitioner who was
sued for negligently assessing the merits of a potential claim
before declining to prosecute it, failing to advise the would-be
plaintiff of the statute of limitations applicable to the claim, and
failing to refer the case to a more specialized attorney. 2 Invari-
ably, proposed solutions offered by course participants that even
suggest attorney liability on the hypothetical facts of the problem
are met with incredulity, if not outright indignation. The author
believes that such responses are more the result of professional
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.S.
1969, J.D. 1976, Ohio State University. Chairman, Ethics Committee, Kentucky Bar
Association (July 1, 1984). The views of the author are not a pronouncement of that
body.
, Information regarding this course may be obtained by writing the Office of
Continuing Legal Education, College of Law, Law Building, University of Kentucky,
Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0048.
2 1 BESKIND, BOCCHINO & SEEKINGER, PROBLEMS AND CASES IN TRIAL ADVOCACY,
CLE EDrIION 341-58 (2d ed. 1982).
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and academic indifference to what might be styled the law of
law practice3 than a result of latent, or patent, self-interest.
Regarding the business of taking or rejecting cases, for ex-
ample, it is regularly observed that the American lawyer is not
a "common carrier." ' 4 Similarly, one is repeatedly reassured that
the attorney "who casually gives curbstone advice ... is [not]
liable for wrong advice.' Nonetheless too ready an acceptance
of such cliches as a restatement of the entire body of law
governing the lawyer's duties and liabilities may prove hazardous
in a legal environment in which the lawyer has become the new
"target defendant. ' 6
To begin with, such rules of thumb do not take into account
the proposition that "[tihe fiduciary relationship existing be-
tween lawyer and client extends to preliminary consultation by
a prospective client with a view to retention of the lawyer,
although actual employment does not result.'" 7 This rule is fa-
miliar to all attorneys in the context of counsel's duty to preserve
the confidences and secrets "of one who has employed or sought
to employ him.' '8 Nonetheless, relatively few practitioners have
considered the implications of unintended violations of this "fi-
duciary relationship" in the context of refusals of employment
or referrals. 9
Similarly, in regard to counsel's liability to third-parties, it
must be remembered that unprecedented pressure is being put
But see L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS: THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
at V. (1982):
A course in legal ethics is, and should be, a law course involving rules of
law and legal problems. That the subject of the rules is ethical conduct
and that the problems may be characterized as ethical in nature does not
make them any the less legal. Ultimately, the subject of all law is ethics
and ethical conduct. A course in legal ethics narrows the subject only in
that it is directed primarily to the rules of conduct for lawyers and rules
relating to the practice of law generally.
SCf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIEILITY EC 2-26 (1981) ("A lawyer
is under no obligation to act as advisor or advocate for every person who may wish to
become his client .. ").
Wade, The Attorney's Liability for Negligence, 12 VAND. L. REV. 755, 758
(1958-59).
6 Braly & Strachan, The Lawyer as Defendant, 6 A.B.A. SEC. LITIGATION 7
(1979).
, Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.)
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 955 (1978).
' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1981).
9 See notes 132-148 infra and accompanying text.
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on the legal profession to curb a perceived flood of groundless
litigation.' 0 Recent court decisions and amendments to the var-
ious codes and rules of procedure have nearly mooted debate
about whether this flood is real or imagined, and, at least in
some jurisdictions, have eroded time honored rules of attorney
immunity." In deciding whether to pursue litigation, today an
attorney must recognize that he or she has an obligation not
only to protect the client's interests, but also to recognize the
legitimate interests of others-if only to minimum degree.
This Article suggests that counsel's obligations to his or her
client, adversary, and fellow members of the bar, as well as to
the judiciary and the justice system, can be balanced without
subjecting attorneys to liability. This balance can be attained,
however, only if potential problems are spotted and minimal
precautions are taken.
I. THE "NON-CLIENT" AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
One need not turn to the hypothetical facts of a Continuing
Legal Education (CLE) exercise' 2 to find the ingredients of a
legal malpractice claim arising from negligent advice given to a
potential plaintiff.
In Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe,13 a potential
client appeared at counsel's office to discuss pursuing a claim
for medical malpractice.' 4 The claim arose from the treatment
of the claimant's husband, who had been suffering from an
aneurism on the left internal carotid artery. The aneurism was
treated by the implantation of a Selverstone clamp, which was
used to control the blood supply through the artery, allowing
the anuerism to heal.' 5 The claimant suspected that the clamp
had not been monitored and adjusted properly, resulting in an
insufficient flow of blood to the patient's brain, severe paralysis,
and a loss of speech.' 6 The claimant-interviewee contended that
"I See, e.g., Underwood, Curbing Litigation Abuses: Judicial Control of Adversary
Ethics-The Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Proposed Amendments to the
Rules of Civil Procedure, 56 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 625, 628 (1981-82).
See notes 85-108, 163-174 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
" 291 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1980).
4 Id. at 690.
'1 Id. at 689.
1' Id. at 690.
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at the conclusion of a 45 to 60 minute interview the attorney-
interviewer opined that "he did not think [there was a] legal
case, [but that] he was going to discuss this with his partner.' '17
The attorney did not request medical authorizations or advise
the claimant of the need for action prior to the expiration of
the period of limitations. The attorney also did not discuss fees
with the interviewee or bill her for his consultation. When the
claimant did not hear from counsel she assumed that "there
wasn't a case,"' 8 and did not consult another lawyer until the
period of limitations governing the original tort claim had ex-
pired. 19
The attorney's defense in the resulting legal malpractice ac-
tion was that no attorney-client relationship ever existed as a
result of his discussions with the claimant.20 According to the
record evidence, the claimant recognized no more than a week
after the interview2' that the attorney would not be representing
her-apparently well before the statute of limitations had run.z2
In other words, the case presented the issue whether an inter-
viewee could bring an action for damages arising from a lost
claim when the interviewee had concluded no more than a week
after the interview (and within the period of limitations) that the
attorney was not going to take any further action on the case.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a jury award total-
ing $649,500.00,23 after observing that the evidence substantiated
the view that the defendant attorney had "failed to perform the
minimal research that an ordinarily prudent attorney would do
before rendering legal advice," ' 24 and that the defendant attorney
," Id. The attorney testified, "The only thing I told her ... after we had pretty
much finished the conversation was that there was nothing related in her factual circum-
stances that told me that she had a case that our firm would be interested in under-
taking." Id. at 691.
Is Id. at 690.
19 Id.
Id. at 692-93.
2 See Comment, Attorney Malpractice: Use of Contract Analysis to Determine
the Existence of an Attorney-Client Relationship, 63 MINN. L. REV. 751 n.6 (1978-79)
(citing Transcript of Proceedings at 53, 54, 69, Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe,
No. 722846 (Minn. Dist. Ct., Hennepin City, Sept. 26, 1978)).
291 N.W.2d at 690.
Id. at 689. The attorney's indemnity and contribution claim against the treating
physician was dismissed in Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe v. Blake, 311 N.W.2d 3 (Minn.
1981).
, Id. at 693.
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had been "negligent in failing to advise [the claimant] of the
two-year medical malpractice limitations period.' '25
The California case of Miller v. Metzinger26 presented a
slightly different scenario. In that case a potential medical mal-
practice plaintiff contacted law firm A regarding the death of
her husband well before the running of the applicable one year
statute of limitations. Firm A obtained the decedent's medical
records and, after reviewing them, declined to handle the case.
Approximately six months later the claimant contacted firm B.27
Although there was conflicting testimony regarding the extent
of firm B's undertaking, the principal attorney handling the
matter admitted that he had agreed to perform at least a prelim-
inary investigation of the file.28 He contended, however, that
"he did not agree to represent her, charge any fee for his services
or secure a retainer agreement." 29 A few days before the expi-
ration of the limitations period, the lawyer from firm B notified
the claimant that he lacked sufficient expertise to handle the
case, and that the file would be referred to firm C.a0 Although
the referring attorney knew that the limitations period was about
to expire,3' he did not advise the claimant of this fact.12 As a
result, the claimant made her first contact with firm C after the
period had lapsed.3 3 In reversing a summary judgment in favor
of firm B, the appellate court observed that "a breach of duty
could be found in [the attorney's] failure to advise plaintiffs of
the necessity to act promptly in contacting [firm C], in view of
the fact that there were only a few days remaining within which
to institute an action." 34
There are obvious differences between the two cases under
discussion. For example, the attorney in Miller apparently ex-
amined the available records, but did not venture an opinion as
to the merits of the case. 5 The only act of negligence allegedly
2 Id. at 694.









Id. at 24, 26.
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committed on his part was his failure to advise the client of the
need for prompt action upon the referral.3 6 When compared with
Togstad, however, it is much easier to conclude that the attorney
in Miller had undertaken to perform some legal service to the
potential plaintiff at or about the time that the claim was lost,
even if that service was only to find another attorney competent
to handle the matter in a timely fashion.37
Although the cases are dissimilar in these and other partic-
ulars, they do contain a common thread: giving incorrect legal
advice to one who has not been formally retained, or failing to
advise a potential client of an applicable period of limitations
under circumstances in which it is forseeable that such conduct
or omission will create an unreasonable risk of harm to that
potential client, may result in attorney liability in tort.33
Admittedly, Miller and Togstad are on the cutting edge of
the law, at least in comparison to many of the cases that are
discussed in other sections of this Article. The author's discus-
sion of them is not meant to be an endorsement. On the other
hand, prudent counsel will anticipate and eliminate the risks of
litigation that are posed by these reported cases, whether or not
the lawyers and judges in his or her particular jurisdiction are
likely to accept them as definitive. At a minimum, these cases
stand for the proposition that counsel should not leave a poten-
tial client dangling.
The testimony of both the plaintiff's and the defendant's
experts in the Togstad case alluded to the following list of
suitable precautionary measures that may be taken to reduce the
threat of litigation initiated by "non-clients":
(1) Before rendering advice to a potential client, obtain ap-
propriate authorizations, review the available records, and con-
sult with an expert in the field, if such consultation is
necessary.39
(2) If it is necessary or appropriate to render an opinion
regarding the merits of a claim, do not purport to render a
"categorical" opinion.40
36 Id. at 29.
I d.
1 Cf. Comment, supra note 21, at 758-59 (cited in Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller
& Keefe, 291 N.W.2d at 693 n.4) (desirable to drop the fiction of implied contract and
recognize that attorney malpractice is negligence action).
3 291 N.W.2d at 691-92. See also note 69 infra.
291 N.W.2d at 692.
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(3) If a potential client consults you regarding his claim, and
the expiration of the statute of limitations is imminent, inform
the interviewee of the applicable statutory period.
4
'
Finally, and with particular reference to the Miller case, counsel
must communicate any decision regarding his intentions in a
timely fashion, and follow-up such communications with appro-
priate correspondence "for the record." 42
II. MoRE REGARDING STATUTES OF LInTATION
While Disciplinary Rule 6-101(A)(3) (hereinafter referred to
as DR)43 provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him,'' 44 traditionally neglect has been defined as
involving more than a single act or omission.4 1 Perhaps as a
result of this restrictive definition, courts and disciplinary au-
thorities have been reluctant to impose punishment on attorneys
for single instances of negligence resulting in the running of a
statute of limitations,4 at least in the absence of aggravating
circumstances.4 7
41 Id.
41 See 154 Cal. Rptr. at 26, 29. In Miller, neither the plaintiff nor the attorney-
defendant had any accurate recollection of either the exact dates of their consultations
or the precise content of their consultations. Id. at 25-26, 28-29. Such uncertainty gave
rise to conflicting testimony and inferences, and virtually precluded a grant of summary
judgment for the defendant. Id. at 28-29.
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(3) (1981).
" Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL. CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983) ("A lawyer shall
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
,1 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1273
(1973) ("Neglect involves indifference and a consistent failure to carry out the obligations
which the lawyer has assumed to his client or a conscious disregard for the responsibility
owed to the client.... Neglect usually involves more than a single act or omission.").
11 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Neale, 384 So. 2d 1264, 1265 (Fla. 1980) ("There is a
fine line between simple negligence by an attorney and violation of Canon 6 that should
lead to discipline."). Cf. In re Goldstaub, 446 A.2d 1192 (N.J. 1982) (references to a
"pattern of negligence" and "gross negligence").
41 See, e.g., In re Deardorff, 426 N.E.2d 689, 692 (Ind. 1981) (involving a "delib-
erate course of deception [to conceal attorney's error] for a period of more than three
years," which included bringing the client to the Indiana statehouse for a fictitious
hearing); Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Peveto, 620 P.2d 392, 394
(Okla. 1980) (misrepresentation to the client and the trial court). Cf. In re Rinzel, 319
N.W.2d 873, 874 (Wis. 1982) (involving efforts to delay or otherwise derail a legal
malpractice suit by the injection of improper defenses and third-party claims against
successor counsel). For conflicting approaches to attempts to limit legal malpractice
liability through settlement see Mass. Comm. on Professional Ethics Op. 82-1 (release
proper if client gives knowing consent and has independent counsel); Florida Bar v.
Leopold, 320 So. 2d 819, 820, 822 (Fla. 1975) (violation of DR 6-102(A) even if client
has consulted independent counsel).
1985-86]
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While this attitude toward formal discipline for neglect may
be changing,48 the malpractice suit remains the primary deterrent
for such omissions. It appears self-evident that "[flailure to file
suit before the running of the period of the statute of limitations
plainly constitutes malpractice where there is no reasonable jus-
tification shown therefor." 49 The following statement is equally
clear:
It does not require expert testimony to establish the negligence
of an attorney who is ignorant of the applicable statute of
limitations or who sits idly by and causes the client to lose the
value of his claim for relief. An attorney who delays the
bringing of an action until the statute of limitations has run is
guilty of negligence if the attorney did not act solely with a
view to promote the interest of his client.5 0
It is obvious that office "dockets," calendars, and "tickler
files" are effective means of avoiding the statute of limitations
trap.5' On the other hand, the discussion that follows demon-
strates that an office system or procedure is no panacea.5 2
A. "Burnout'"--The Disabled Lawyer
Two recent cases 53 involving the malpractice of litigation
attorneys merit special interest, not because they broke new
ground, but because they direct our attention to a common
phenomenon-the existence of which is typically ignored and
frequently denied. These cases are similar in that both involved
an attorney's failure to meet a statute of limitations or other
procedural deadline, but not as the result of simple inadvertance.
On the other hand, they differ with respect to the age and
experience of the attorneys involved. While the first decision
dealt with the plight of a young attorney who had allowed
41 See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Yates, 677 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Ky. 1984) (failure
to file estate tax return injured client and resulted in public reprimand). See also In re
Crane, 255 N.W.2d 624 (Mich. 1977) (failure of both attorney and former associate to
file suit prior to the running of the statute of limitations); In re Pump, 326 N.W.2d 773
('Wis. 1982) (discipline notwithstanding a settlement with the client).
41 Hoppe v. Ranzini, 385 A.2d 913, 916 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
" George v. Caton, 600 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
See J. SMITH, PREVENTING LEGAL MALPRACTICE 39 (1981).
1 See notes 53-67 infra and accompanying text.
11 In re Barry, 447 A.2d 923 (N.J. 1982); In re Loew, 642 P.2d 1171 (Or. 1982).
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himself to be subjected to professional demands beyond his
capacity 5 4 the second decision involved a seasoned, successful
specialist."
In the case of In re Barry,16 the malpractice of a newly
admitted lawyer came to light when a client "came storming
into the office"' 7 demanding to see one of the lawyer's superiors.
The supervising attorney related the following scenario to disci-
plinary authorities:
At this point I asked [the younger attorney] to get the file and
come in. He brought in a file jacket with [what], I believe,
was the original letter I had gotten in the file and turned it
over to Tom and I said, "Bring me the whole file." I looked
at it and saw the original letter from when I turned it over to
him and asked him for the balance of the file and he said,
"That's it."
He didn't do anything on the file [although the case had sup-
posedly been in progress for at least four years]. I gulped, like
I am gulping now, and asked if he had filed the complaint and
he indicated that he hadn't, and at that point I called my part-
ners.., to come down to the office and indicated, "I think we
have a problem." 58
Unfortunately, eighteen or so other files were in the same shape. 9
This situation should not have come as a complete surprise to
the firm. The newly-admitted lawyer had been carrying a total
of 200 cases.60
In In re Loew,61 disciplinary charges resulted from an expe-
rienced litigator representing a client in a licensing proceeding
before the National Transportation Safety Board. After suffering
an adverse ruling before an administrative law judge, the client
447 A.2d 923.
" 642 P.2d 1171.
" 447 A.2d 923.
" Id. at 924.
" Id.
I' d. A lone justice dissented from the opinion imposing a suspension, observing:
The conclusion is inescapable that a considerable measure of blame for
respondent's predicament must fall on the shoulders of the principals in
the law firm that employed him, even though he does not seek to place it
there.... The "sink or swim" approach is ill-suited to a high volume
professional operation.
Id. at 926 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
1-1 642 P.2d 1171.
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urged counsel to pursue appropriate appellate remedies. After
filing a notice of appeal, counsel failed to submit a brief, al-
though three extensions of time were granted. After the appeal
was dismissed, counsel even failed to capitalize on an opportun-
ity to reopen the appeal. For almost a year between the filing
of the notice of appeal and counsel's discharge, the client placed
nearly forty telephone calls to counsel that went unanswered and
unreturned.62 The Supreme Court of Oregon reluctantly con-
cluded that a temporary suspension from practice was war-
ranted.63
What these seemingly "extraordinary and bizarre" 64 cases
have in common is that both involved well-intentioned people
who came to grief, in part because they tried to do too much.
As a result, the younger of the two began "suffering from
psychic conflicts, . . . [developed] anxiety related to his work
setting, and [became unrealistic in] his thinking and reason-
ing. .... "65 The more experienced attorney became afflicted with
what a psychiatrist styled the "burnt out syndrome."
A common pattern of the syndrome is that a professional
person feels obligated to help each person who seeks his help,
takes on more work than he can handle, including work he
finds unpleasant, and evades such work by procrastination and
self-denial. 6
Neither attorney asked for help nor sought to refer his problem
cases to another lawyer. Neither felt able to do so. The tragedy
of the fledgling associate might have been avoided had his law
firm followed the recommendations of the dissenting justice in
the reported opinion and instituted "a systematic, organized
routine for periodic review of a newly admitted attorney's files." 67
B. The Last Minute Interview or Referral
All of the cases discussed so far involved situations in which
counsel had ample opportunity to assess the merits of a case
62 Id. at 1172.
61 Id. at 1173-74.
6 447 A.2d at 923.
61 Id. at 925.
6 642 P.2d at 1173 (footnote omitted).
67 447 A.2d at 926.
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before deciding to accept it and file suit, or take other action to
advance the matter. Needless to say, the luxury of time is not
always available. This is particularly true for the specialist who
receives cases on referral from other lawyers.
As one expert in the field of attorney malpractice recently
observed, "a considerable dilemma arises when a lawyer must
quickly sue without adequate information. 63 The following sec-
tions illustrate the increasing judicial and legislative recognition
of the rights of potential adversaries to a certain degree of
freedom from the burdens of groundless and vexatious litigation.
This recognition, however, has aggravated the problems of the
lawyer who has insufficient time to investigate the claim.69 For
now it is enough to consider counsel's potential liability to the
client when the statute of limitations requires the prompt filing
of a complaint. The author asks the reader to assume that
counsel had only a limited opportunity to investigate and assess
the merits of the claim, and exercised due care in light of the
information that was reasonably available. Nonetheless, later
(post-filing) developments in the case now lead counsel to con-
clude that the litigation is without merit. Recognizing the falli-
bility of such a judgment, and the fact that a precipitous exit
from the case might send signals to the opposing party that
could jeopardize any chance the client might still have for a
settlement on favorable terms, counsel might be at a loss to
determine a proper course of action.
In such a situation an attorney may glean considerable guid-
ance from the California case of Kirsch v. Duryea.70 Kirsch had
received surgical treatment for a shoulder injury suffered in a
fall. 7' Following the surgery, Kirsch's physician placed his arm
in an airplane splint.7 2 Shortly after the removal of the splint,
Kirsch complained of numbness in the shoulder and forearm,
1- Zilly, Recent Developments in Legal Malpractice Litigation, 6 A.B.A. SEc.
LITIGATION 8, 13 (1979).
6' In this regard, see Mahaffey v. McMahon, 630 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Ky. 1982), which
suggests that in many medical malpractice cases, a layman's opinion or recitation of
facts may not provide probable cause for a lawsuit.
578 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1978).
Id. at 937.
Id. "An airplane splint is designed to hold the patient's arm in the air perpen-




and of considerable loss of motion in the affected arm. Subse-
quent diagnoses suggested several possible causes of this disabil-
ity, including the possibility of ulnar nerve damage attributable
to improper splinting. Just days before the running of the statute
of limitations, Kirsch was referred to Duryea, an attorney spe-
cializing in medical malpractice litigation. On the strength of the
limited information available, which included conflicting medical
reports attributing the disability to a variety of possible causes,
Duryea filed a complaint alleging medical malpractice. Approx-
imately four months later, Duryea came to the conclusion that
there was insufficient evidence to justify a trial. 73 The Supreme
Court of California summarized the available evidence:
There was no direct evidence that the airplane splint was faulty.
The one doctor who first believed that the injury was due to
a defective splint, in a subsequent letter of December 1964,
questioned his own initial opinion .... Based on the materials
available to defendant, the possibility of recovery was re-
mote. . .. "I
Upon reaching a determination that the case was marginal, at
best, counsel attempted to contact his client and withdraw from
the litigation. 75 Unfortunately, the fact that the client had moved
to a state some distance from the California forum complicated
this task. Nonetheless, counsel attempted to avoid any prejudice
to the client by offering to cooperate with any substitute counsel
designated by the client and by warning of the need for prompt
action in light of a five-year trial requirement set forth in the
California Code of Civil Procedure. When the client failed to
respond, counsel repeated his attempts to contact the client prior
to filing a formal motion for withdrawal. Indeed, upon the filing
of this motion, the court continued the matter pending yet
another notice. In the meantime, Kirsch attempted unsuccessfully
to obtain substitute counsel. At least one of the attorneys Kirsch
contacted assessed the case negatively, as had Duryea. Although
Kirsch finally obtained substitute counsel, he never replied to
any of the notices sent by Duryea. Ultimately, the case was
dismissed before substitute counsel contacted Duryea. 76
73 Id.
41d.
71 Id. at 937-38.
76 Id. at 938.
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Surprisingly, a jury found attorney Duryea liable for negli-
gence, and awarded Kirsch $231,175.50 in damages, presumably
on the strength of expert opinion to the effect that Duryea waited
too long prior to effecting his withdrawal. 7 The California
Supreme Court, however, rejected this reasoning. Writing for
the court, Justice Clark observed that in the circumstances of
the case:
lAin attorney should not seek a nonconsensual withdrawal
immediately upon determination that the case lacks merit, but
should delay to give his client an opportunity to obtain other
counsel or to file a consensual withdrawal.
Plaintiff's expert testified that the attorney who concludes
his client's case lacks merit should quickly proceed to obtain
a nonconsensual discharge. This is contrary both to ... [the
California] rules of professional conduct and the American
Bar Association's disciplinary rule.
78
In reversing the jury verdict, the court noted the following
facts, which might serve as a checklist for the prudent practi-
tioner seeking to withdraw under similar circumstances:
(1) counsel had reviewed all the records in the file, and
conversed with physicians, and had completed his medical and
legal research to make an informed decision regarding the
merits of the cause;79
(2) counsel gave due notice of his intended withdraval; 80
" Id.
"' Id. at 223. The MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-I10(A)(2)
(1981), provides:
[A] lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has taken rea-
sonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client,
including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for employment of
other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and property to which the
client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws and rules.
MODEL RUtLEs OF PROFE.SSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (1983) is virtually identical to DR
2-110(A)(2). Regarding the relevance of the Code and Rules as a measure of attorney
liability in legal malpractice cases, see Van Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641,
645 n.1 (Alaska 1981) (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).




(3) counsel offered to provide all materials regarding the
case to the client and other attorneys designated by the client;"'
and
(4) counsel delayed in seeking a formal order of with-
drawal in an effort to avoid the inference of lack of merit.'
On the other hand, there might be rare situations in which
a more hasty withdrawal is justified. For example, a preliminary
investigation conducted after the retainer, but before the filing
of a complaint, might yield convincing evidence that a case has
no merit, or even a suggestion of client fraud. Given counsel's
potential liability to the adversary (discussed in the following
section),83 a prompt withdrawal, even in the face of the statute
of limitations, might be the only course available. In such a
case counsel might consider coupling a frank explanation of the
circumstances with some directions on how the client may pro-
ceed pro se if that is still his or her choice. In any event, no
"duty of loyalty" should compel an attorney to engage in an
act of self destruction.
III. LIABILITY TO Timw PARTES
A. Commencing Groundless Litigation
While the opinion in Kirsch v. Duryea85 indicated that coun-
sel may be able to commence, and then withdraw from litigation
without incurring liability to the client,8 6 the opinion did not
address liability arising from the initiation or prosecution of a
case to the client's adversary.87
Over the last ten years, the legal community had focused
much attention on the countersuit for malicious prosecution as
a mechanism for providing compensation to third parties for the
burdens and expenses of unwarranted litigation. Nonetheless,
SI Id. at 938.
s Id. at 940.
,' See notes 87-131 infra and accompanying text.
14 Cf. Van Berkel v. Fox Farm and Road Machinery, 581 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (D.
Minn. 1984) (continued prosecution of action that was clearly barred by statute of
limitations-fee award of $2,894.62 under 28 U.S.C. § 1927).
11 578 P.2d 935 (Cal. 1978).
Id. at 939-40.
*' See id. at 940.
[Vol. 74
1985-86] ATToRNEY ACCOUNTABILITY
despite a few notable exceptions, such as Kentucky law,18 courts
have been reluctant to abandon time honored rules conferring
absolute immunity on attorneys.89 At the least, courts have shored
up some traditional barriers to too-easy recovery in malicious
prosecution actions against trial counsel. 9 For example, the so-
called "English Rule" has been retained in a number of juris-
dictions. 9' The rule requires pleading and proof of the plaintiff's
arrest or the seizure of his property, or some other special injury
in addition to the usual hardship resulting from the malicious
prosecution of the original action. This rule at least has the
salutary effect of forcing a malicious prosecution plaintiff to
present evidence substantiating conclusory allegations of injury
to reputation and loss of present and future income attributed
to the original "vexatious" proceeding. 92
Similarly, a few jurisdictions have adopted a more objective
culpability threshold for determining if litigation has been initi-
ated with "probable cause," 93 while other courts have concluded
that allowing the recovery of substantial general and punitive
damages against attorneys under such standards "is inconsistent
1 See, e.g., Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981) (awarding compensatory
and punitive damages against attorney for malicious malpractice prosecution).
" See, e.g., W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397, 399-
400 (Ct. App. 1976).
' See, e.g., Ayyildiz v. Kidd, 266 S.E.2d 108, 111-12 (Va. 1980) (malicious
prosecution action by physician against attorney dismissed for failure to allege "special
injury").
"I See id. at 111:
By the English common law rule, followed by a sizeable minority of
American states, the malicious prosecution doctrine is not extended to a
civil proceeding, even though this proceeding is instituted for a improper
purpose and without probable cause, unless there is an arrest of the
defendant in that civil action, seizure of his property, or some other special
injury to him (emphasis added).
"I See, e.g., 266 S.E.2d at 111-12. Cf. 621 S.W.2d at 900 (alleged injury to a
physician's reputation held to be "special injury" despite an absence of proof of
pecuniary harm of "special, or out-of-pocket" injury). See generally Underwood, supra
note 10, at 633 nn.35-36, (pointing out that the Raine Court erroneously concluded that
allegations of negligence are necessarily defamatory, and inadvertantly circumvented the
traditional rule that allegations in pleadings are privileged).
' See Tool Research & Engineering Corp. v. Henigson, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291, 297
(Cal. Ct. App. 1975) ("An attorney has probable cause to represent a client in litigation
when, after a reasonable investigation and industrious search of legal authority, he has
an honest belief that his client's claim is tenable in the forum in which it is to be tried.")
(emphasis added). Cf. 621 S.W.2d at 901 (lack of probable cause one of key ingredients
of malicious prosecution action).
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with the role of the attorney in the adversary system." ' 94 As one
court recently observed:
A lawyer may be confronted with the choice between allowing
the statute of limitation to run upon a claim with which the
client has only recently come forward, or promptly filing a
lawsuit based on the information in hand .... Time will not
always permit "a reasonable investigation and industrious search
of legal authority" before the lawyer must file a complaint to
preserve the client's claim-and thus, perhaps, avoid an action
by the client for legal malpractice.95
The successive drafts of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct reflect the fear that a "reasonableness" standard might
result in a proliferation of countersuits against trial attorneys.96
For example, the 1981 Proposed Final Draft of Model Rule 3.1
[Meritorious Claims and Contentions] provides: "A lawyer shall
not bring or defend a proceeding.., unless there is a reasonable
basis for doing so. . . . ,97 Shortly thereafter the Rule was
amended to provide: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there
is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous. . . -91 Nonetheless,
this version of the amended rule was accompanied with a
comment" and notes illustrating the drafters' intent that the
phrase "a basis for doing so that is not frivolous" was to be
read as an objective inquiry.' °° When the rule was finally adopted
by the American Bar Association (ABA), however, all references
to an objective culpability standard were deleted, leaving the test
9 Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 604 (Mich. 1981). Specifically, the court
opined, "Framed as it is in terms of 'reasonableness,' the Henigson standard is difficult
to reconcile with the lawyer's obligation to represent his client's interests zealously." Id.
at 606. See also Underwood, supra note 10, at 633-35 (noting the potential "chilling"
effect inherent in awards of substantial general and punitive damages via the countersuit
against counsel).
312 N.W.2d at 604.
The author has been informed that Ronald Mallen, author of LEGAL MALPRAC-
TICE (1981), spoke out against a new "reasonable" standard in the American Bar
Association (ABA) proceedings.
9' MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (Proposed Draft 1981).
" MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1983).
w Id. at Rule 3.1 comment.
,00 See Underwood, supra note 10, at 637.
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of "frivolity" hardly more enlightening than the language of
the "old" Code of Professional Responsibility.1"'
Even so, it would appear that the original draft of Model
Rule 3.1 did not go unnoticed. At the time that the drafters
carved an objective culpability threshold out of the proposed
disciplinary rule, a similar standard was incorporated into a new
version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (hereinafter refered
to as FRCP). l 2 This standard also received honorable mention
in the federal case law allowing fee awards for prevailing parties
under the so-called "bad faith exception."' 10 3
Elsewhere the author has argued that, "an award of fees
directly against errant counsel as part of 'costs' pursuant to an
appropriate standard of culpability, would serve as a sufficient
deterrent to frivolous litigation, without the negative effects of
a countersuit." ' 4 Moreover, the author observed that while few
state courts recognized a "bad faith" rule for fee awards, 105
many "rules" jurisdictions might adopt amended FRCP 11106
"" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1981) provides a
subjective standard of attorney culpability: "(A) In his representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit, assert a position, [or] conduct a defense ... when he
knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously
injure another" (emphasis added). Regarding the problems of enforcement engendered
by this standard, see Underwood, supra note 10, at 635-36.
',-2 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (hereinafter cited as FRCP), as amended in 1983, provides:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief.., formed after reasonable inquiry it
is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Id. (emphasis added).
"" See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980), wherein the court cited
the 1981 draft of Model Rule 3.1 and opined:
A claim is colorable, for the purpose of the bad faith exception, when it
has some legal and factual support, considered in light of the reasonable
beliefs of the individual making the claim. The question is whether a
reasonable attorney could have concluded that facts supporting the claim
might be established....
Id. at 348 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
"' Underwood, supra note 10, at 634 (citing Birnbaun, Physicians Counterattack:
Liabiity of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FoRD-
HAm L. REv. 1003, 1083 (1976-77)).
11-1 For a statutory fee award provision, see Sommer v. Carr, 299 N.W.2d 856, 857
(Wis. 1981) (applying Wis. STAT. ANN. § 814.025 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-85)).
" See, e.g., KY. R. Crv. P. 11.
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and award attorney fee sanctions as an alternative to countersuit
damages,'0 7 and as a substitute for, or supplement to, traditional
forms of discipline. '°S
B. "Bad Faith Continuance of Meritless Litigation": A New
Wrinkle?
It has been noted that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
may allow a prevailing defendant an award of attorney's fees if
the plaintiff's action was brought without an adequate factual
basis.'0 9 In addition, the Second Circuit's recent opinion in Nem-
eroff v. Abelson"1 demonstrates that although an attorney may
have an adequate factual basis for commencing a lawsuit, a fee
award sanction may nonetheless be imposed if further proceed-
ings are conducted in an "intentionally dilatory fashion,""' or
if "during the litigation and prior to dismissal, sufficient facts
[become] available to [plaintiff] to demonstrate that a failure at
that point to withdraw the action [would amount to] bad faith."" 2
Nemeroff was a class action filed by a shareholder of Techn-
icare Corporation against Abelson, a columnist for Barron's
Business and Financial Weekly, Dow Jones (Abelson's pub-
lisher), and several investors who were acquaintances of Abel-
son's. The original complaint alleged that the investor-defendants
profited from short sales based on advance information to be
published in future columns. An amended complaint later changed
the theory, alleging that the investor-defendants had induced the
columnist to write negative articles to enhance their short posi-
,o Of course, FRCP 11 sanctions may be invoked as a response to defenses and
counterclaims that are not well grounded in fact. See In re National Student Marketing
Litigation, 445 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1978) (party seeking security for costs must show
that action was brought in bad faith or is frivolous); American Automobile Ass'n., Inc.
v. Rothman, 104 F. Supp. 655 (E.D.N.Y. 1952) (purpose of FRCP 11 is to keep issues
that an attorney knows to be false out of a case).
"I Recent cases in which counsel were reprimanded or suspended for violations of
DR 7-102(A)(1) include: Phelps v. Kansas Supreme Court, 662 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 19S1);
In re Phelps, 637 F.2d 171, 173 (10th Cir. 1981); Florida Bar Ass'n v. Hunt, 429 So.
2d 1201, 1204 (Fla. 1983); In re Haasze, 336 So. 2d 76, 77 (Fla. 1976); In re Clark, 539
P.2d 242, 244-46 (Idaho 1975); In re Cartwright, 282 N.W.2d 548, 551-52 (Minn. 1979);
In re Hopp, 634 P.2d 238, 240-41 (Or. 1981).
,o See notes 102-108 supra and accompanying text.
Ito 704 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1983).
Id. at 660.
12 Id. at 655.
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tions. Almost a year later, plaintiff's counsel agreed to a dis-
missal of the case." 3
Because plaintiff's counsel had some circumstantial evidence
of a relationship between several critical columns and the activity
in Technicare stock which was "supported" by some rumors of
wrongdoing in the financial community, and because counsel
had understood from a conversation with a lawyer from the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) that the NYSE had found a
"correlation" between the dates of the columns and certain short
sales, the Second Circuit concluded that there had been an
adequate basis for commencing the suit. Six months later, how-
ever, NYSE disavowed any such "correlation" in a formal re-
port. Between the receipt of this report in July 1977 and the
following May when the case was dismissed, counsel did nothing
to "replace the correlation" with other evidence." 4 Moreover, a
July 1977 deposition of plaintiff's key witness "revealed that he
had no direct support for his previous statements that Abelson
was leaking information to the investor defendants.""' The ap-
pellate court opined:
Given the thinness of Nemeroff's case and the questionable
origins of his suit, the District Court was probably entitled to
find bad faith solely because Nemeroff and his attorneys elected
to pursue the matter for several months after July 19, when
they should have realized that they had no support for their
charges." 6
The trial judge, however, also explored the dilatory conduct of
the case after the collapse of the plaintiff's case. Specifically,
the trial judge observed that, rather than pursuing aggressive
discovery from the investor-defendants or Abelson to establish
the crucial link between them, counsel instead engaged in dis-
covery relating to class certification and to certain inconsequen-
tial matters." 7 The appellate court agreed that this course of
conduct was further evidence of bad faith: "[T]hey must have
appreciated that they had at best an extremely marginal case. In
" Id. at 654.
"I ld. at 655.
"' Id. at 657.




such a situation, we should expect [the plaintiff's attorneys] to
make vigorous efforts to shore up their case, rather than to
allow the matter to meander through pretrial procedures."" 8IS
C. On Means and Ends
Disciplinary Rule 7-105 prohibits threatening "to present
criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil mat-
ter."' 9 Moreover, DR 1-102(A)(6) contains the vague command-
ment that thou shalt not "engage in any other conduct that
adversely reflects on [your] fitness to practice law.' ' 20 While the
continued vitality of these rules may be in doubt,' 2 ' prudence
dictates that counsel refrain from making threats to secure an
advantage in a civil case. 2 2 In order to reinforce this proposition,
it is appropriate to examine the holdings of some of the "lead-
ing" cases, without an elaborate discussion of whether they were
decided properly.
In State v. Harrington,23 an attorney was hired by a wife
seeking to obtain a divorce from her husband on grounds of
adultery. 24 After setting up a compromising situation for the
husband to fall into and arranging for photographs, our hero
forwarded a demand letter, which included the following:
[A]ny such settlement would include the return to you of all
tape recordings, all negatives, all photographs and copies of
photographs that might in any way, bring discredit upon your-
self. Finally, there would be an absolute undertaking on the
part of your wife not to divulge any information of any kind
or nature which might be embarrassing to you in your business
life, or your life as it might be affected by the Internal Revenue
"I Id. at 660. The trial court's award of attorney's fees of $50,000 to the publishing
defendants and $26,000 to the investor-defendants was affirmed.
,t MODEL CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105 (1981).
,20 Id. at DR 1-102(A)(6).
121 The ABA Model Rules contain no provision like DR 7-105, and no explanation
for its deletion. But see MODEL RUtES AT PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1983)
(professional misconduct to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects").
122 See Kentucky Bar Association E-265 (1982) (hereinafter cited as KBA) (regarding
threat to file a complaint against opposing counsel).
21 260 A.2d 692 (Vt. 1969), discussed in Livermore, Lawyer Extortion, 20 Asuz. L.
REv. 403, 404-08 (1978).
124 260 A.2d at 693.
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Service, the United States Customs Service, or any other gov-
ernmental agency.
[Y]ou should have [this letter] in your possession by March
13, at the latest. Unless the writer has heard from you on or
before March 22, we will have no alternative but to withdraw
the offer and bring immediate divorce proceedings in Grafton
County. This will, of course, require the participation by the
writer's correspondent attorneys in New Hampshire. If we were
to proceed under New Hampshire laws, without any stipula-
tion, it would be necessary to allege, in detail, all of the
grounds that Mrs. Morin has in seeking the divorce. The writer
is, at present, undecided as to advising Mrs. Morin whether
or not to file for 'informer fees' with respect to the Internal
Revenue Service and the United States Custom Service. In any
event, we would file, alleging adultery, including affidavits,
alleging extreme cruelty and beatings, and asking for a court
order enjoining you from disposing of any property, including
your stock interests, during the pendency of the proceeding. 25
The attorney was convicted of attempted extortion. 26
Moving from the sinister to the puerile, we arrive at the case
of State v. Zeigler,'27 which involved the use of the following
form letter:
OH! THE JOY OF BEING SUED!!
How do you explain to the neighbors and the kids when the
Sheriff's car pulls up front and an officer hands you the
summons?
OR, how do you explain a garnishment to the boss, and the
other fellows at work???
I don't know, but I guess you do; at least you didn't bother
to answer my letter. You do not need to send me your check
immediately to pay your account, because I am not going to
bother you any more-but the Sheriff will. Oh yes, I will see
you in court.
' Id. at 695-96.
'' Id. at 700.
538 P.2d 643 (Kan. 1975).
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You owe _$
PAY ME NOW!!!' 28
The attorney was suspended for violating DR 1-102(A).
Finally, it is once again worth noting that disciplinary pro-
ceedings are not counsel's only worry when the threats begin to
fly. In Kinnamon v. Staitman & Snyder, 29 conduct in violation
of DR 7-105110 gave rise to a civil action for damages for the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.'
31
IV. To REFER OR NOT TO REFER
DR 6-101(A)(1) provides, in pertinent part, "[a] lawyer shall
not ... handle a legal matter which he knows or should know
that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him
a lawyer who is competent to handle it. ' ' 12 The consequences
of handling a legal matter incompetently need not be elabo-
rated."' Consequently, counsel must "become competent" to
handle his or her cases, or associate with another who is com-
petent to handle them, or refer them to someone else.'3 4 This
"common sense" is buttressed by the merging doctrine that if a
general practitioner undertakes to perform professional services
without the aid of a specialist under circumstances in which a
reasonably careful skillful practitioner would refer the case to a
specialist, then that attorney's work will be judged against a
specialist's standard of care. 3-
'1 Id. at 644.
'9 136 Cal. Rptr. 321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
"I Attorney, the defendant in the action, had threatened the plaintiff with a criminal
complaint for presenting a cold check to his client. Id. at 322.
I' d. at 322.
' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101(A)(1) (1931).
'c" See In re Deardorff, 426 N.E.2d 689 (Ind. 1981) (suspension for failure to confer
with or associate with an attorney competent to handle the matter); Dayton Bar Ass'n
v. Moore, 442 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1982) (indefinite suspension for improper handling of a
class action and several domestic relations cases); Dayton Bar Ass'n v. Timen, 405
N.E.2d 1038 (Ohio 1980) (public reprimand for improper handling of matters in federal
court).
' ' See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.1 comment (1933).
'' See Home v. Peckham, 158 Cal. Rptr. 714, 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Johnston,
Attorney Accountability in Kentucky-Liability to Clients and Third Parties, 70 Ky.
L.J. 747, 751-63 (1981-82).
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Unfortunately, the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility contains provisions that discourage, as well as en-
courage, referral of cases to specialists. There is an obvious
economic reason why cases may not be referred. Specifically,
DR 2-107(A), governing division of fees among lawyers, states,
among other things, that fee splitting among lawyers who are
not associated in practice is unethical unless the division is made
in proportion to the services performed and the responsibility
assumed by each lawyer. 36 The referring lawyer cannot collect
an unearned fee as a "broker."'' 37 Putting it another way, "[t]o
merely recommend another lawyer or refer a case is not per-
forming a legal service,"' 3 and the referring attorney can collect
no fee. 139
The tension between DR 2-107(A) and the notion that a
failure to refer may approach malpractice' 40 led to the ABA's
adoption of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(e), which
provides:
A division of fee between lawyers who are not in the same
firm may be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed
by each lawyer or, by written agreement with the client,
each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the represen-
tation;
(2) the client is advised of and does not object to the
participation of all the lawyers involved; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable. "4'
The rule-which would allow fee splitting pursuant to a written
contract after full disclosure and with client consent, and if the
referring lawyer assumes responsibility' 42 has been touted as a
way to "get complex cases into competent hands and protect
"' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(2) (1981).
See id.
Belli v. Shaw, 631 P.2d 980, 984-85 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 657 P.2d
315 (Wash. 1983). See In re Diamond, 368 A.2d 353, 354 (N.J. 1976). See also KBA E-
264 (1983); KBA E-55 (1971).
'. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIO AL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A)(2) (1981).
"I Granelli, Referral Fees: Legal Kickbacks?, The Nat'l L.J. April 27, 1981 at 1,
col. 4.
'14 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5(e)(1)-(3) (1983).
"I' It is unclear whether the responsibility assumed includes malpractice liability.
1985-86]
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the client from ignorance and overpayment.' 1 43 The philosophy
of the new rule appears to be that responsible brokering of cases
may be desirable. 144
Finally, it should be noted that counsel's decision to refer a
case, or associate himself or herself with another attorney during
the conduct of a particular case may result in certain "unex-
pected" legal consequences. Despite an ultimate reversal on the
facts of the case, Tormo v. Yormark,'45 a widely read decision
of the United States District Court for the district of New Jersey,
continues to be read as a warning that a referring attorney may
incur liability to the client if he knew or should have known
that the attorney to whom the case was referred was incompetent
or dishonest.' 46 Similarly, a trial judge in the case of J.M.
Cleminshaw Co. v. City of Norwich147 imposed discovery sanc-
tions on "counsel of record" because of the discovery abuse of
another attorney who had been conducting the "more active
representation" of the client.' 48
V. WITHDRAWAL
There are many reasons why counsel might wish to withdraw 49
or be compelled to withdraw'50 from pending litigation. It is not
the author's goal to enumerate the recognized grounds for per-
missive or mandatory withdrawal, although it is worth noting
here that courts have become more critical of the abandonment
of clients based upon economic considerations. 5'
141 Granelli, supra note 140, at 10, col. 4 (quoting the late Robert Kutak). Accord
Moran v. Harris, 182 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) ("If the ultimate goal is to
insure the best possible representation for a client, a forwarding fee is an economic
incentive to less able lawyers to seek out experienced specialists to handle a case.").
- 182 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
,41 398 F. Supp. 1159 (D.N.J. 1975) (referring counsel found not negligent for
failing to further inquire into out-of-state counsel's background).
Id. at 1171.
93 F.R.D. 338 (D. Conn. 1981).
,43 Id. at 349.
"I See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(C)(1)(a)-(f) (1981)
(permissive withdrawal).
See id. at DR 2-110(B)(1)-(4) (1981) (mandatory withdrawal).
"' See, e.g., Kriegsman v. Kriegsman, 375 A.2d 1253, 1256 (N.J. Super. 1977)
(client's inability to pay unanticipated fees and expenses did not justify withdrawal of
firm that had agreed upon a fixed fee). See also Vann v. Shilleh, 126 Cal. Rptr. 401,
406 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (client's inability to pay attorney's fees does not justify counsel's
withdrawal from case on Friday before Monday trial); Imhoff v. Hammer, 305 A.2d




Instead, the author's purpose is to emphasize that a lawyer
must protect a client's interests upon withdrawal. Specifically,
DR 2-110(A)(2) provides:
[A] lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has
taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the
rights of his client, including giving due notice to his client,
allowing time for employment of other counsel, delivering to
the client all papers and property to which the client is entitled,
and complying with applicable laws and rules. 1 2
The importance of adhering to this rule is best illustrated by
yet another "rogues' gallery" of cases which might be subtitled
"how not to get out of a case." Generally, these cases fall into
one of two categories.
First, there are those cases in which counsel did not provide
notice adequate to allow the client time to find another lawyer
and preserve his or her claim or defense, or to avoid the disrup-
tion of the court's docket associated with the necessity of ob-
taining a continuance.'5 3 Clearly, the loss of the client's claim
or defense is likely to result in discipline, 54 if not malpractice
liability.'55
Second, there are a surprising number of reported cases
involving abuse of the attorney's lien to secure some advantage
over the client. 56 Such conduct may not only run afoul of the
rule regarding "delivery to the client of all papers and property
to which the client is entitled,' ' 7 but also the rule that counsel
has a duty to suggest the employment of successor counsel and
cooperate with that counsel. 5 For example, attorneys have been
disciplined for retaining client files for the purpose of hindering
"' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(2) (1981). See also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(d) (1983) which parallels the CODE
provision.
-' See, e.g., Smith v. Bryant, 141 S.E.2d 303, 306 (N.C. 1965).
,' See Florida Bar Ass'n v. Gray, 380 So. 2d 1292 (Fla. 1980); In re Price, 261
S.E.2d 349 (Ga. 1979) (public reprimand of attorney for causing loss of claim when
statute of limitations ran).
"' But see Van Horn Lodge, Inc. v. White, 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1981) (attorney
exonerated over a strong dissent discussing pertinent ethical considerations and their
implications for malpractice liability).
':" See, e.g., In re Kaufman, 567 P.2d 957, 960 (Nev. 1977).
,s, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110(A)(2) (1981).
" See id.
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the client's effort to retain new counsel,' 59 for the purpose of
securing a fee splitting arrangement with successor counsel,' 6
and for the purpose of securing the payment of a disputed fee.' 6'
Similarly, courts have ruled that counsel's withholding of a
client's papers to secure a release from malpractice liability is
unethical and tortious.' 62
VI. FRIvoLoUs APPEALS
At a recent meeting of the Federal Bar Association in Louis-
ville, Kentucky, Court of Claims Chief Judge Alex Kozinsld
noted that "the ground rules of federal litigation have
changed,"'63 citing a recent Second Circuit opinion awarding
double costs and attorney's fees against a lawyer who had pros-
ecuted a frivolous appeal.' 64 Judge Kozinski's observations are
confirmed by a number of opinions sanctioning lawyers for
abusing the appellate process to secure delay gain.' 65 We can
expect to see an increase in judicial activity in this area in both
state and federal courts. In that regard, the reader is urged to
examine a remarkable opinion by the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, dissenting from an order admitting an
attorney to practice before the high court.' 66 The attorney made
,19 See, e.g., Dixon v. State Bar Ass'n, 653 P.2d 321, 325 (Cal. 1982).
'6 See, e.g., 567 P.2d at 960.
161 See, e.g., Academy of California Optometrists, Inc. v. Superior Court, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). Cf. In re Thomsen, 499 P.2d 815, 816 (Or. 1972)
(nonappearance based on alleged fee dispute unethical).
62 Nolan v. Foreman, 665 F.2d 738, 743 (5th Cir. 1982) (client may sue for money
damages based upon attorney's breach of ethics and fiduciary duty). Compare In re
Wetzel, 574 P.2d 826, 829 (Ariz. 1978) (bad faith litigation initiated to coerce payment
of fees) with Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kissel, 442 A.2d 217, 221 (Pa. 1982)
(application of client funds to satisfy disputed fee, and other collection practices).
13 Judge Kozinski's comments are reported at 52 U.S.L.W. 2186 (October 4, 1983).
164 United States v. Potamkin Cadillac, 689 F.2d 379 (2d Cir. 1982) (appeal was
"totally lacking in merit, framed with no relevant supported law, conclusory in nature,
and utterly unsupported by evidence").
'16 In re Visioneering Constr., 661 F.2d 119 (9th Cir. 1981) (default entered against
party who wilfully and in bad faith failed to comply with discovery orders); United
States v. Pierce, 609 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1979) (reprimand); Cosenza v. Kramer, No.
A018214 (Cal. Ct. App. March 12, 1984); Maple Properties v. Harris, No. 69423 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1984) ($20,000 fine for inclusion of frivolous issues on appeal); Florida Bar
Ass'n v. Rosenberg, 387 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 1980) (two paragraph affadavit was frivolous
and insufficient to avoid summary judgement).
16, In re Brose, 51 U.S.L.W. 3898 (June 20, 1983).
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his application for admission in connection with a petition for
a writ of certiorari seeking review of a $10,000 fee award against
the attorney and his client in the case of Wood v. Santa Barbara
Chamber of Commerce. 67 Chief Justice Burger's opinion traced
the procedural history of that litigation, which began as a "pro
se" antitrust, copyright, and defamation action in the Central
District of California. After engaging in flagrant discovery abuse,
the "pro se" claimant suffered a dismissal of his lawsuit. Suc-
cessive appeals proved fruitless. Undeterred, the "pro se" claim-
ant filed a new complaint in the original trial court to set aside
the prior dismissal on grounds of fraud, naming sixteen defend-
ants including the special master that had been appointed to
supervise discovery in the earlier action.' 68 Once again, the case
was dismissed, 69 and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
and awarded sanctions against the appellant. 7 0 The Ninth Circuit
noted that following the dismissal of another lawsuit in Nevada,
the claimant had brought thirty-six other cases in thirty-one
districts in nine circuits involving three hundred defendants.
Those cases had apparently been consolidated and ultimately
dismissed after the claimant ignored the instructions of the Ne-
vada trial judge. Sometime later the claimant filed a "pro se"
notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 7' At that point, attorney
Brose entered his appearance in the case, cosigned the appellate
brief, and moved to disqualify the entire panel of judges assigned
to hear oral argument. The appellate court affirmed the lower
court's dismissal and, once again, imposed sanctions on the
claimant and attorney Brose. 72 The Chief Justice was outraged
by the attorney's conduct: "Clearly, Brose was fully aware of
all [his client's] abuse of the system when he agreed to associate
with [the client]. By advocating yet another appeal of a trial
court's dismissal of [the client's] frivolous claims, Brose joined
and perpetuated an abuse of the judicial process.'1 7 The mes-
sage? To quote Judge Kozinski, "know when to give up."'74
" 699 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1445 (1984).
51 U.S.L.W. at 389S.
Id.
699 F.2d at 485-86.
" Id. at 485.
,,2 Id. at 485-86 (sanction of $1250 to each of the eight groups filing a brief in the
appeal).
," 51 U.S.L.W. at 3899.
,,4 52 U.S.L.W. at 2186.
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